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Introduction 
 
The traditional definition of corporate governance is that of “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury 
Committee,1992: p 15). Indeed, corporate governance is concerned with 
the interaction of a company’s management, board of directors and 
stakeholders in ensuring the fairness of such a system. It needs 
hardly be said that corporate governance systems needed reform in the 
past decades for the sake of protecting the various stakeholders. For 
example, neither the USA nor the European Union could envy each other 
in the light of recent major corporate scandals such as Enron and 
Parmalat. Crises stimulate the search for new and more rigorous 
methods of surveillance and control (Moran, 1986). As would therefore 
be expected, both legislators and regulatory bodies have been 
increasingly involved in the tightening up of the global legislative 
regulatory framework. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence of this was, in the U.S.A, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 which, according to the Act itself was 
enacted “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures”. In a comparable manner, in the 
European Union, the 8th Directive on Company Law was finally 
implemented in 2006 further to the Commission’s 2003 Action Plan for 
Modernising Company Law and Corporate Governance at EU Level 
(European Union Commission,2003). Among other changes, the 8th 
Directive mandates audit committees for listed companies and includes 
fundamental changes around the relations of the board directors with 
the auditors.  
Indeed, several other new rules, accounting and auditing standards 
and improvements have by now taken hold in many countries: it is good 
news for investors that boards of directors are becoming increasingly 
independent, audit committees are acting with newly found scepticism 
and autonomy and chief executive officers are assuming greater 
responsibility for financial reporting (Deloitte and Touche, 2006). 
After all, a much-quoted survey of investor perceptions indicates 
that investors are willing to pay more for a company that is well-
governed and that the quality of corporate governance standards ranks 
alongside financial performance and other factors when deciding 
whether to invest in a company. (Mckinsey,2004). 
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In this vein, and even beyond legislation, most countries have 
developed their code of recommendations in this area - witness, for 
example, the many recent corporate governance codes listed by the 
European Corporate Governance Institute on its website (ECGI, 2006 
online), including that of Malta introduced in 2001, revised in 2005 
and intended to be adopted by issuers of listed securities. 
Since 2001 the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA) listing 
rules have encouraged such issuers to „endeavour to adopt‟ the 
principles of the “Code of Good Corporate Governance”. The Rules 
require issuers to include in the Annual Report a statement, verified 
by the auditors, with regards to the effective measures they have 
taken to ensure compliance with the Code. Therefore , although  the 
whole Code as such is not obligatory, listed companies in effect 
would already best adopt the “comply-or-explain” principle of 
explaining from which parts of the code they depart, if they do so, 
and their reasons.    
Yet a largely ignored but important doubt lingers with the advent of 
the myriad of this and further corporate governance laws, rules, 
standards and codes: are the overall implications of such a regime, 
if any, being appropriately weighed? This paper debates some such 
implications and their significance on Maltese listed companies by 
considering one particular proposed corporate governance change by 
the European Union Commission: the statutory inclusion in its 
Proposed Amending Directive Com (2004) 725 of a Corporate Governance 
Statement in the annual report of listed companies.  
The Proposed New Corporate Governance Statement 
The Amending Directive proposes a Corporate Governance Statement 
which not only requires the application of the 'comply-or-explain' 
principle already referred to above to a specified code of corporate 
governance, but also a number of other disclosure requirements. The 
main such requirements are: 
- the disclosure of the operation of the shareholder meeting and its 
key powers,  
- a description of shareholder’s rights and how they can be 
exercised; as well as the composition and operation of the board of 
directors and its committees, and 
- the disclosure of the companies' internal control and risk 
management systems. 
With regard to the first two disclosures requirements above regarding 
shareholders and board of directors, these should still create no 
significant changes with respect Maltese listed companies : the 
descriptions will mostly involve disclosing what is already required 
in Maltese company law, in itself EU compliant However, there are 
major issues to consider even in Malta if the Commission were to move 
ahead with the third disclosure requirement of the companies’ 
internal control and risk management systems. In this respect, even 
according to the Explanatory Memorandum of the proposed directive 
itself (Section 2c), consultation has already shown that stakeholders 
disagree as to the need to go further than the application of the 
“comply–or-explain” principle. In fact, “while business was reluctant 
to go further other stakeholders favoured additional disclosure, in 
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particular information about the risk management system applied by 
listed companies”. 
 
Disclosing to Everybody in the Dark? 
A main issue here is that unless benchmarks are first agreed and 
established as to what is expected to be disclosed, such disclosures 
will probably be meaningless and mostly wasteful of resources as 
little, if any, inter-company comparisons or even inter-period 
comparisons may be carried out. Both phrases “internal control” and 
“risk management systems” are wide-ranging and umbrella ones.     
Internal controls involve so many aspects of the organisation – among 
others, its plans, lines of reporting, delegation of authority, 
segregation of duties, physical security aspects, management and 
supervision, the internal audit, personnel policies, the overall 
control environment. Similarly, risk management systems also permeate 
almost everywhere: there are business, financial, physical, 
managerial, legal, foreign exchange and several other types of risks 
to manage.  
If serious enough, sub-committees of listed company boards of 
directors such as audit and risk management ones need in fact to be 
continuously occupied with both controls and risks. Yet, one may ask 
what with this increased requirement the “other stakeholders” are 
really after, because the exercise may unwittingly result in another 
public relations showcase showing the acceptable law-abiding face of 
their companies. How worthwhile is it for such boards to engage 
further financial and legal consultants at considerable cost to 
venture out politically correct information? While annual reports are 
increasingly thick and glossy, they are also probably being read 
less. Additionally, given the differing tastes of the various 
stakeholders, there will invariably be variances as to which items to 
disclose and also as to the desired level of detail – too commonly 
virtually impossible to satisfy. Can this merely lead to expensive 
information overload?   
Even from the management’s perspective, this may be an example of a 
questionable add-on to the contrasting demands which are continuously 
being made on them both for more accountability and for more value by 
stakeholders in search of an ever-bigger piece of the corporate cake.  
After all, over the years, in addition to much more demanding boards 
of directors, traditional watchdogs have been highly empowered while 
others freshly installed, all in the name of corporate governance: 
the external auditors with their tightened international auditing 
standards, the internal auditors with their more strategic role, the 
varying regulators with their  pressing and expensive demands, in 
many instances even three or more of them such as  industry, listing 
and company ones, government authorities at the various levels - 
local central and European all armed with new compulsory legislation.  
In allocating scarce resources in a tough, cost-cutting and dynamic 
environment, the “boss” or chief executive officer already finds it 
difficult as it is to strike a successful balance between delivering 
a good bottom line and coping with these elements of the regulatory 
framework. 
In particular, stakeholders remote from the boardroom may too easily 
underestimate the significance of this. Requiring companies to 
disclose more and more on what they are doing will not necessarily 
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make their operations more understandable. If one is not careful 
enough, companies may substantially be made to churn much more 
paperwork than before, but stakeholders given only a false sense of 
security.  
This is not to say that the march of modern corporate governance 
needs to stop. The scrutiny of the governance and control being 
exercised at the top is a process that is to go on: new and better 
ways may be thus found for  exercising reasonable checks and balances 
such as preventing anyone from having unfettered powers of 
discretion, distinguishing between possibly conflicting roles even 
beyond chairman and chief executive, and improving on the existing 
relationships of Boards of Directors and the different types and 
sizes of shareholders, and even making directors and chief executives 
more generally accountable. But before promulgating new rules, the 
regulating authorities need to undertake serious impact assessments 
of such regulations taking into reasonable account the major 
stakeholders involved. A lesson to Europe in this context was the 
largely unforeseen cost to many American companies of implementing 
the above-mentioned Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA. While benefits 
were clearly reaped, the stricter regime has also resulted in 
consultancy and audit shooting up dramatically, at least in the 
initial years. As a result, controversies still rage as to how far it 
is cost-beneficial both to the companies and their stakeholders. 
More specifically to this corporate governance statement requirement, 
the demand for more information to be made public can have its 
benefits if the sender knows clearly what to give and the receiver 
what to expect. This would entail spelling out specific details of 
the benchmarking standards. In working out these, the regulators 
would need also to consider and as far as possible take into account 
the potential pitfalls emanating from the attitudes of the parties 
involved as such attitudes may effectively inhibit the transmission 
of meaningful information. For example, senders may be too intent in 
protecting their interests and may be shrewd or resourceful enough to 
be able to filter the information in that interest. On the other 
hand, the major “stakeholders” could easily include inquisitive and 
potentially manipulative competitors, lethargic shareholders 
interested only in their dividend cheques, potential short-termist 
investors trying to speculate on the market, financial advisors with 
too many hats or conflicts of interest (particularly in a small 
island-state) and even some journalists with their political agenda 
on how to interpret company communications. While definitely one d 
cannot solve all issues resulting from such attitudes, yet their 
consideration would definitely influence the type of information to 
be asked for.  
Giving less but what is needed 
Perhaps an even better alternative is to re-examine the need for the 
corporate governance statement to go beyond the “comply-or-explain” 
principle. If one borrows the concept from auditing, the typical 
established statutory audit report addressed to company shareholders 
does not in any way venture information unless there is the need for 
qualification or emphasis – and the approach seems to have worked. 
One reason for this is that the accompanying statutory financial 
statements are already heavily and increasingly regulated as to what 
to contain or not.  One may therefore either decide not to ask for 
more disclosure with respect to corporate governance, or if more 
information is to be required, reserve it to the major changes that 
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have occurred in controls or risks during the year. However, this 
information could also be incorporated with the other statements or 
reports in the annual report, such as in the directors’ report. In 
any case, one perhaps needs best to avoid general descriptions of 
systems: what if you were made to listen to the whole story of what 
happens in your car controls by your mechanic every morning before 
starting off? In reality, you are only interested if anything is 
wrong.  
Furthermore, inasmuch as a car mechanic will best point out car 
trouble, it is not the company but an independent specialist who will 
probably be best equipped to make – rather than merely verify aspects 
- of the statement. Rather than a financial auditor, perhaps it would 
be best to engage either a management specialist for the purpose. 
Thus, if  independent Board of Director sub-committees are 
functioning in a company, the chairman of, say, the Risk Management 
Committee may be required present the risk management aspect in a 
report to the AGM, while the chairman of the Audit Committee will 
present the internal control aspects. 
A Question of Priorities 
Perhaps, the pertinent question is even more fundamental: is the 
current emphasis on information disclosure the best approach to 
ensure progress in corporate governance? Could it be that regulatory 
priorities need re-shuffling? After all, irrespective of the 
regulatory framework in force, it is invariably dependent for its 
success or failure on the persons involved. Before regulating on the 
information, it could be much better to think of tightening up the 
present regulation of the persons involved in the process. For this, 
one perhaps needs to re-visit the corporate governance modus operandi 
taken for granted over the years. For instance, with respect to the 
minimum qualifications required of directors:  should candidates for 
board directorships in non-financial listed companies continue to be 
considered fit and proper for the position despite their having no 
background in ethics, law and finance, and/or business education in 
general? Are shareholding interests and financial backing to remain 
enough in practice to secure appointment to the boards of such 
companies? Furthermore, on being appointed to this position, should a 
short introductory familiarisation course, if held at all, suffice? 
In addition, with respect to the statutory term of appointment of 
directors: given that they are in charge of long-term strategies for 
their companies, is it wise to appoint them every annual general 
meeting? Why not has their appointment for a non-renewable but 
reasonable number of years such as five to seven years? In this 
manner one would promote the long-term vision and continuity at the 
top which are necessary for many corporate governance matters. Why 
should directors care about minimising risks if the weight of such 
risks will become apparent only beyond the term of office - next year 
or even after? Moreover, although a profit retention policy may be 
needed for a company’s long-term financial survival, how can 
directors refrain from recommending that extra dividend demanded by 
shareholders once they are completely dependent for imminent re-
election?  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the proposed corporate governance statement disclosure 
requirement cannot be described as a scourge, but it is not a boon 
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either. It could easily be like driving a car repeatedly around a 
roundabout – a fuel-consuming exercise without going any 
where. To continue on the car analogy, it is also useless to try to 
stop cars from overspeeding, but then fail to insist on a proper 
driver’s licence. In the area of corporate governance, we may need 
not only to slow down and not over-regulate, but, probably even more 
importantly, to insist with a sense of urgency on a proper licence 
for the corporate drivers in charge.  
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